The young man Xi He spent much of his childhood in the relatively luxurious residential complex of China’s ruling elite in Beijing. During the Cultural Revolution, however, with his father purged and out of official favor, he was sent to the countryside in 1969 (to rural Shaanxi province), where he worked for six years as a laborer in an agricultural commune. During that period, he developed an especially good relationship with the local peasantry, which would give him credibility in his eventual rise through the ranks of the CCP.
In 1974 Xi he became an official member of the party, being appointed secretary; the following year he began attending Tsinghua University in Beijing, where he studied chemical engineering. After graduating in 1979, he worked for three years as a secretary to Geng Biao, who was deputy prime minister and minister of National Defense in the central government of China.
In 1982, Xi He resigned from that post, preferring to leave Beijing and work as an undersecretary of the PCC in Hebei province. He settled there until 1985, when he was appointed a party committee member and deputy mayor of Xiamen (Amoy) in Fujian province. While living in Fujian, Xi he married well-known folk singer Peng Liyuan in 1987. Continuing his political career, in 1995 he rose to the post of deputy secretary of the provincial party.
In 1999 he became acting governor of Fujian, and became governor the following year. Among his concerns as head of Fujian were environmental conservation and cooperation with neighboring Taiwan. He served as deputy governor and governor until 2002, when he was promoted once more: that year marked his transfer to Zhejiang province, where he served as interim governor and, since 2003, party secretary. While there, he focused on restructuring the province’s industrial infrastructure to promote sustainable development.
The fortune of Xi received another boost in early 2007, when a scandal surrounding Shanghai’s top leadership led him to take over as the city’s party secretary. His predecessor in office was among those who had been tainted by a vast pension fund scheme. In contrast to his reformist father, Xi he had a reputation for prudence and party line, and, as Shanghai’s secretary, his focus was on promoting stability and restoring the city’s financial image. However, he held office for only a short period, as he was elected, in October 2007, as one of the nine members of the standing committee of the CPC Political Bureau (Politburo), the highest body in the party.
With that promotion, Xi was included in a short list of probable successors to Hu Jintao, general secretary of the CCP since 2002 and president of the People’s Republic since 2003. The position of Xi he became more confident when he was elected vice president of China in March 2008. In that role, he focused on preserving and improving international relations. In October 2010, he was appointed vice chairman of the powerful Central Military Commission (CMC), a position once held by Hu (who had been chairman of the commission since 2004) and generally regarded as an important stepping stone to the presidency.
In November 2012, during the 18th CCP Party Congress, Xi he was again elected a member of the standing committee of the Political Bureau (reduced to seven members), and succeeded Hu as party secretary general. At that time Hu also handed over his position in the CMC to Xi. On March 14, 2013, he was elected president of China by the National People’s Congress.
The new president’s first initiatives were a nationwide anti-corruption campaign that eventually eliminated thousands of high and low officials (the “tigers” and the “flies”). Xi also stressed the importance of the “rule of law”, demanding adherence to the Chinese constitution and further professionalization of the judiciary as a means to develop “socialism with Chinese characteristics.”
Under the leadership of Xi, China was increasingly assertive in international affairs, insisting on its claim to territorial sovereignty over almost the entire South China Sea, despite an adverse ruling from the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague and promoting its “One Belt, One Road “for joint trade, infrastructure and development projects with East Asia, Central Asia and Europe.